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Monastero: Due Process

DUE PROCESS
United States ConstitutionAmendment V.
No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
United States ConstitutionAmendment XIV:
[Nor] shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ....
New York ConstitutionArticle I, Section 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Buie'
(decided December 20, 2001)

Kevin Buie was convicted of three counts of murder in the
second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and
robbery in the first degree.2 Buie appealed his conviction arguing
that the prosecution's delay in revealing the names of two
exculpatory witnesses violated the spirit of Brady v. Maryland3 by
'289 A.D.2d 140, 735 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 2001).
2id.

3 373

U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution
that is favorable to an accused who has requested it violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good

faith or bad faith of the prosecution).
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denying him due process guarantees inherent under both the
Federal 4 and New York State5 Constitutions.6 He further argued
that the "verdict was not based on legally sufficient evidence and
was against the weight of the evidence." 7 The Appellate Division,
First Department affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the
verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence, was not against
the weight of the evidence, and the prosecution's delay in
disclosing the identity of the witnesses to Buie did not violate the
due process protections of either the Federal or New York State
Constitutions.8
Buie's appeal alleged that the delay in receiving the names
and addresses of two exculpatory witnesses violated Brady.9 More
specifically, Buie claimed the police reports that had been
disclosed to him contained witness information that provided the
police with descriptions of other suspects, whose descriptions were
at odds with his physical characteristics. 0 Although the names and
addresses of the two witnesses who supplied these descriptions
were not initially disclosed, that information was provided to Buie
two months before trial." The court, however, found that Buie did
not even establish that either of the two witnesses' testimony
would have been exculpatory, and further noted these persons did
not even claim to witness the shootings.12 The court stated that one
witness' testimony was "vague and confusing," and found the
other witness, who claimed he had seen a man carrying a gun
leaving the building at the time the crime occurred, had an
"4extremely poor vantage point', 3 As a result, the court held that
there was "no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law ......
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6, states in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived
of6 life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Buie, 289 A.D.2d at 140, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 46.

7Id.

8id.

9Id.
10 Id.

,IBuie, 289 A.D.2d at 140, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
12
id.
13Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/6

2

Monastero: Due Process

2002

DUE PROCESS

209

would have been different" if the defendant found the witnesses,
or
14
alternatively, if their hearsay statements were used at trial.
The seminal case dealing with the prosecution's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant is Brady v.
Maryland.'5 In Brady, the defendant and a companion were tried6
separately, both found guilty of murder, and sentenced to death.'
Although Brady testified at his trial that he participated in the
crime, he claimed that Boblit, his companion, committed the actual
killing.17 Prior to his trial, Brady's attorney requested that the
prosecution provide him an opportunity to examine the
extrajudicial statements of Boblit. The prosecution seemingly
complied with the request by allowing defense counsel to view
several of Boblit's statements. However, subsequent to Brady's
conviction and sentence, it was discovered that one statement, in
which Boblit admitted committing the homicide, was withheld. 8
Based on the suppression of the exculpatory statement by the
prosecution, Brady appealed his conviction.' 9
The United States Supreme Court found that Brady's
conviction was based on the deliberate suppression of the
statement. 20 The Court held that the prosecution's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession, that is both
favorable and material to the defendant's guilt or punishment,
violates due process. 2' The Court further noted that this standard is
applicable regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. 22
More than twenty years later, the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Bagley,23 articulated the standard for
determining when undisclosed evidence is material.24 Bagley was
indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and
14 id.

'5373
I6Id.

U.S. at 83.

at 84.
17Id.
is Id.
19
20

Id.

21

Id.

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

22 Id.

23473 U.S. 667 (1985).
24 id.
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firearms statutes.25 Six days before trial, the defense filed a
discovery motion requesting the prosecution provide "the names
and addresses of the witnesses that the government intends to call
at trial. Also the prior criminal records of witnesses, any deals,
promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their
testimony.
The prosecution did not disclose to the defense any
"deals, promises or inducements" that were made to two
witnesses. 27 After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of the
narcotics charges and found not guilty with respect to the firearms
charges. Subsequent to his conviction, Bagley discovered the
undisclosed contracts of two government witnesses that
demonstrated that the witnesses were paid for providing the
government with information.
The defendant appealed his
conviction, alleging the prosecution's failure to disclose the
contracts of the two witnesses violated due process under Brady. °
In deciding the standard of materiality to be applied to
Brady violations, the United States Supreme Court in Bagley
discussed that due process affords the defendant a fair trial, and as
such, the prosecution must disclose to the defendant evidence
favorable to him.3 ' The contracts that were withheld contained
evidence that would have been used to impeach the witnesses by
demonstrating bias or interest, and the Court refused to draw a
distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment
evidence. 32 Accordingly, the Court held that this evidence is
protected under the rule of Brady.33 However, before overturning a
conviction, there must be a finding of "materiality. 34 In order for
the undisclosed evidence to be material, there must be a finding
that the undisclosed evidence would have changed the judgment or

Id. at 669.
ld. at 669-70.
27 Id. at 670.
25
26

28 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 671.
29

Id.

Id. at 672.
Id. at 675.
32
Id. at 676.
33 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677.
30

31

34 id.
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verdict.3 5 The Court held that evidence is material if there is a

"reasonable probability that it would have altered the outcome of
the trial."3 6 The Court further held that this standard of materiality
applies regardless of whether the defendant makes a specific or
general request for the favorable evidence, or whether the
defendant requests the evidence at all. 7
In People v. Vilardi,1a the New York Court of Appeals
addressed the standard that is applicable in New York when
determining whether exculpatory evidence is material3 9 In that
case, the defendant was convicted of arson in the first degree,
attempted arson in the first degree and conspiracy, resulting from
the planned explosion of a pizzeria and laundromat.4 ° Defense
counsel made a pretrial motion for all reports dealing with the
laundromat explosion. 4' The prosecution seemingly complied with
the request and sent all reports, with the exception of one. It was
not until after the defendant was convicted that defense counsel
realized there was an undisclosed report.
Based on the
prosecution's failure to disclose the exculpatory material, the
defendant appealed. 43 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, vacated the defendant's conviction based on the
prosecution's failure to disclose the report."4 Specifically, the
Appellate Division found there "was a reasonable possibility that
the undisclosed material contributed to the defendant's conviction"
and granted the defendant a new trial.45
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the
prosecution in Vilardi argued that New York courts should follow
the "reasonable probability" standard set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Bagley.46 In deciding whether New York
3

Id.

- Id. at 682.
37 id.
38
39

76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).

Id.

40 Id.at
41Id. at
42 Id.

43

69-70, 555 N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
70, 555 N.E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 519.

Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 71, 555 N.E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 519.

44d.

45 Id.
46

Id. (emphasis added).
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should follow the standard set forth by the federal system, which is
less favorable to the defendant, the New York Court of Appeals
noted that even before the Brady decision, New York had
recognized a due process right in this area.47 That right was based
on fairness to the defendant and the ethical and professional
obligation of the prosecutor.48 Based on those principles, the New
York Court of Appeals declined to adopt the federal standard of
"reasonable probability" of materiality and continued to follow the
standard more favorable to the defendant. 49 This requires a
showing of "reasonable possibility" that failure
to disclose the
50
exculpatory evidence contributed to the result.
The Appellate Division, First Department, in People v.
Perry,5 ' addressed the issue of when exculpatory material must be
turned over to the defendant. 2 In Perry, the defendant argued on
appeal that untimely disclosure by the prosecution of a potential
witness violated Brady.5 3 During jury selection, the prosecution
disclosed to the defendant information of a possible exculpatory
witness, and at that juncture the defendant was unable to locate the
potential witness.5 4 The Appellate Division, First Department held
that the defendant did not successfully persuade the court that
47

48

Id. at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (citing

People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1987);
People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1979);
People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 325 N.E.2d 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1975);
People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956);
People v. Creasy, 236 N.Y. 205, 140 N.E. 563, 236 N.Y.S. 205 (1923).
49 Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d
at 522.
50 Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (citing People v. Smith, 63
N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984); People v. Porter, 128
A.D.2d 248, 516 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1987); People v. Valez, 118 A.D.2d
116, 504 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1st Dep't 1986); People v. Pugh, 107 A.D.2d 521, 487
N.Y.S.2d 415 (4th Dep't 1985); People v. Kitt, 86 A.D.2d 465, 450 N.Y.S.2d
319 (1st Dep't 1982); People v. Ramos, 146 Misc.2d 168, 550 N.Y.S.2d 784
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1990) (predicting New York will continue to adhere to
the "reasonable possibility" standard, which is consistent with the "right sense of
justice" standard New York courts have relied upon)).
5'266 A.D.2d 151, 700 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1st Dep't 1999).
52
53

54

id.
id.
Id.
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earlier disclosure would have resulted in locating the witness, and
further held that the defendant did not make a showing that the
witness' testimony would
have been exculpatory.5 5 As such, his
56
conviction was affirmed.
Similarly, in People v. Cortijo,57 the defendant argued the
prosecution's disclosure of "Brady material" was untimely. 8 The
defendant was convicted of attempted murder and criminal
possession of a weapon.5 9 He appealed his conviction alleging that
the prosecution did not disclose all exculpatory evidence prior to
trial, and thus violated Brady.60 During trial, the defendant had
discovered that the prosecution was aware of two eyewitnesses.6 '
The defendant was afforded an opportunity to interview one of the
witnesses, and declined to call him as a defense witness.62 The
Appellate Division, First Department and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction. 63 The New York
Court of Appeals held that the defendant's due process rights were
not violated because he was "given a meaningful opportunity to
use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine
the
' '4
case.
his
during
evidence
as
or
witness
prosecution's
Additionally, in People v. McKee,65 the defendant was
convicted of murder in the second degree. 6 He subsequently
appealed his conviction arguing the prosecution's delayed
disclosure of "Brady material" entitled him to introduce a hearsay
statement as a sanction for the delay. The "Brady material" at
issue was a summary of a purported witness interview with police,
which gave a description of an assailant that was inconsistent with

55 id.

266 A.D.2d at 151,700 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
N.Y.2d 868, 517 N.E.2d 1349, 523 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1987).

5770
58

Id.

59 Id.

6 Id.
61
62

63
64

65
66

Id.

Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d at 868, 517 N.E.2d at 1349, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
id.

Id.
269 A.D.2d 225, 703 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1st Dep't 2000).
Id.

67 id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [2002], Art. 6

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 18

the defendant's physical characteristics. 6" However, the material
had been provided to the defendant three weeks prior to trial.69
Defense counsel had an opportunity to interview the individual,
who subsequently denied witnessing the crime and even making
the statement. 7 0 Accordingly, the defense did not call him as a
witness. 7' The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding
that the defendant had ample time to make "effective use of the
information.'72
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of when exculpatory evidence, "Brady material," must be
disclosed to the defendant, and therefore cannot provide lower
courts with guidance on that issue. However, the United States
Supreme Court in Bagley addressed the appropriate standard for
determining when undisclosed exculpatory evidence constituting a
"Brady violation" is "material" and requires reversal of
defendant's conviction. 3 Rather than follow the federal system,
which provides that undisclosed exculpatory evidence is "material"
when there is a "reasonable probability" the undisclosed evidence
would have changed the judgment or the verdict, the New York
Court of Appeals relied on its strong pre-Brady policy of affording
greater protection in this area than the federal system.74
Accordingly, New York has declined to follow the "reasonable
probability" standard of materiality set forth by the federal system,
and continues to afford greater due process protection for the
defendant, holding that undisclosed exculpatory evidence is
"material" when there is a "reasonable possibility" that the
75
undisclosed evidence contributed to the result.
DeborahA. Monastero

68

1d.

69 id.
70

McKee, 269 A.D.2d at 225, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 447.

71id.
72 Id.

73
74

71

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677.
Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
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